Comments on the draft amendments to the IT Rules (Jan 2023)

The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (“MeitY”) proposed amendments to the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (“Intermediary Guidelines”) on January 17, 2023. The draft amendments aim to regulate online gaming, but also seek to have intermediaries “make reasonable efforts” to cause their users not to upload or share content identified as “fake” or “false” by the Press Information Bureau (“PIB”), any Union Government department or authorised agency (See proposed amendment to Rule 3(1)(b)(v).) The draft amendments in their current form raise certain concerns that we believe merit additional scrutiny.  

CCG submitted comments on the proposed amendment to Rule 3(1)(b)(v), highlighting its key feedback and concerns. The comments were authored by Archit Lohani and Vasudev Devadasan and reviewed by Sachin Dhawan and Jhalak M. Kakkar. Some of the key issues raised in our comments are summarised below.

1. Misinformation, fake, and false, include both unlawful and lawful expression

The proposed amendment does not define the term “misinformation” or provide any guidance on how determinations that content is “fake” or “false” are arrived at. Misinformation can include various forms of content, and experts have identified up to seven subtypes of misinformation such as: imposter content; fabricated content; false connection; false context; manipulated content; misleading content; and satire or parody. Different subtypes of misinformation can cause different types of harm (or no harm at all) and are treated differently under the law. Misinformation or false information thus includes both lawful and unlawful speech (e.g., satire is constitutionally protected speech).  

Within the broad ambit of misinformation, the draft amendment does not provide sufficient guidance to the PIB and government departments on what sort of expression is permissible and what should be restricted. The draft amendment effectively provides them with unfettered discretion to restrict both unlawful and lawful speech. When seeking to regulate misinformation, experts, platforms, and other countries have drawn up detailed definitions that take into consideration factors such as intention, form of sharing, virality, context, impact, public interest value, and public participation value. These definitions recognize the potential multiplicity of context, content, and propagation techniques. In the absence of clarity over what types of content may be restricted based on a clear definition of misinformation, the draft amendment will restrict both unlawful speech and constitutionally protected speech. It will thus constitute an overbroad restriction on free speech.

2. Restricting information solely on the ground that it is “false” is constitutionally impermissible

Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution allows the government to place reasonable restrictions on free speech in the interest of the sovereignty, integrity, or security of India, its friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or contempt of court. The Supreme Court has ruled that these grounds are exhaustive and speech cannot be restricted for reasons beyond Article 19(2), including where the government seeks to block content online. Crucially, Article 19(2) does not permit the State to restrict speech on the ground that it is false. If the government were to restrict “false information that may imminently cause violence”, such a restriction would be permissible as it would relate to the ground of “public order” in Article 19(2). However, if enacted, the draft amendment would restrict online speech solely on the ground that it is declared “false” or “fake” by the Union Government. This amounts to a State restriction on speech for reasons beyond those outlined in Article 19(2), and would thus be unconstitutional. Restrictions on free speech must have a direct connection to the grounds outlined in Article 19(2) and must be a necessary and proportionate restriction on citizens’ rights.

3. Amendment does not adhere with the procedures set out in Section 69A of the IT Act

The Supreme Court upheld Section 69A of the IT Act in Shreya Singhal v Union of India inter alia because it permitted the government blocking of online content only on grounds consistent with Article 19(2) and provided important procedural safeguards, including a notice, hearing, and written order of blocking that can be challenged in court. Therefore, it is evident that the constitutionality of the government’s blocking power over is contingent on the substantive and procedural safeguards provided by Section 69A and the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009. The proposed amendment to the Intermediary Guidelines would permit the Union Government to restrict online speech in a manner that does not adhere to these safeguards. It would permit the blocking of content on grounds beyond those specified in Article 19(2), based on a unilateral determination by the Union Government, without a specific procedure for notice, hearing, or a written order.

4. Alternate methods to counter the spread of misinformation

Any response to misinformation on social media platforms should be based on empirical evidence on the prevalence and harms of misinformation on social media. Thus, as a first step, social media companies should be required to provide greater transparency and facilitate researcher access to data. There are alternative methods to regulate the spread of misinformation that may be more effective and preserve free expression, such as labelling or flagging misinformation. We note that there does not yet exist widespread legal and industry consensus on standards for independent fact-checking, but organisations such as the ‘International Fact-Checking Network’ (IFCN) have laid down certain principles that independent fact-checking organisations should comply with. Having platforms label content pursuant to IFCN fact checks, and even notify users when the content they have interacted with has subsequently been flagged by an IFCN fact checker would provide users with valuable informational context without requiring content removal.

Report on Intermediary Liability in India

The question of when intermediaries are liable, or conversely not liable, for content they host or transmit is often at the heart of regulating content on the internet. This is especially true in India, where the Government has relied almost exclusively on intermediary liability to regulate online content. With the advent of the Intermediary Guidelines 2021, and their subsequent amendment in October 2022, there has been a paradigm shift in the regulation of online intermediaries in India. 

To help understand this new regulatory reality, the Centre for Communication Governance (CCG) is releasing its ‘Report on Intermediary Liability in India’ (December 2022).

This report aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the regulation of online intermediaries and their obligations with respect to unlawful content. It updates and expands on the Centre for Communication Governance’s 2015 report documenting the liability of online intermediaries to now cover the decisions in Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India and Myspace vs. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd, the Intermediary Guidelines 2021 (including the October 2022 Amendment), the E-Commerce Rules, and the IT Blocking Rules. It captures the over two decades of regulatory and judicial practice on the issue of intermediary liability since the adoption of the IT Act. The report aims to provide practitioners, lawmakers and regulators, judges, and academics with valuable insights as they embark on shaping the coming decades of intermediary liability in India.

Some key insights that emerge from the report are summarised below:

Limitations of Section 79 (‘Safe Harbour’) Approach: In the cases analysed in this report, there is little judicial consistency in the application of secondarily liability principles to intermediaries, including the obligations set out in Intermediary Guidelines 2021, and monetary damages for transmitting or hosting unlawful content are almost never imposed on intermediaries. This suggests that there are significant limitations to the regulatory impact of obligations imposed on intermediaries as pre-conditions to safe harbour.

Need for clarity on content moderation and curation: The text of Section 79(2) of the IT Act grants intermediaries safe harbour provided they act as mere conduits, not interfering with the transmission of content. There exists ambiguity over whether content moderation and curation activities would cause intermediaries to violate Section 79(2) and lose safe harbour. The Intermediary Guidelines 2021 have partially remedied this ambiguity by expressly stating that voluntary content moderation will not result in an intermediary ‘interfering’ with the transmission under Section 79(2). However, ultimately amendments to the IT Act are required to provide regulatory certainty.

Intermediary status and immunity on a case-by-case basis: An entity’s classification as an intermediary is not a status that applies across all its operations (like a ‘company’ or a ‘partnership’), but rather the function it is performing vis-à-vis the specific electronic content it is sued in connection with. Courts should determine whether an entity is an ‘intermediary’ and whether it complied with the conditions of Section 79 in relation to the content it is being sued for. Consistently making this determination at a preliminary stage of litigation would greatly further the efficacy of Section 79’s safe harbour approach.

Concerns over GACs: While the October 2022 Amendment stipulates that two members of every GAC shall be independent, no detail is provided as to how such independence shall be secured (e.g., security of tenure and salary, oath of office, minimum judicial qualifications etc.). Such independence is vital as GAC members are appointed by the Union Government but the Union Government or its functionaries or instrumentalities may also be parties before a GAC. Further, given that the GACs are authorities ‘under the control of the Government of India’, they have an obligation to abide by the principles of natural justice, due process, and comply with the Fundamental Rights set out in the Constitution. If a GAC directs the removal of content beyond the scope of Article 19(2) of the Constitution, questions of an impermissible restriction on free expression may be raised.

Actual knowledge in 2022: The October 2022 Amendment requires intermediaries to make reasonable efforts to “cause” their users not to upload certain categories of content and ‘act on’ user complaints against content within seventy-two hours. Requiring intermediaries to remove content at the risk of losing safe harbour in circumstances other than the receipt of a court or government order prima facie violates the decision of Shreya Singhal. Further, India’s approach to notice and takedown continues to lack a system for reinstatement of content.  

Uncertainty over government blocking power: Section 69A of the IT Act expressly grants the Union Government power to block content, subject to a hearing by the originator (uploader) or intermediary. However, Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act may also be utilised to require intermediaries to take down content absent some of the safeguards provided in Section 69A. The fact that the Government has relied on both provisions in the past and that it does not voluntarily disclose blocking orders makes a robust legal analysis of the blocking power challenging.

Hearing originators when blocking: The decision in Shreya Singhal and the requirements of due process support the understanding that the originator must be notified and granted a hearing under the IT Blocking Rules prior to their content being restricted under Section 69A. However, evidence suggests that the government regularly does not provide originators with hearings, even where the originator is known to the government. Instead, the government directly communicates with intermediaries away from the public eye, raising rule of law concerns.

Issues with first originators: Both the methods proposed for ‘tracing first originators’ (hashing unique messages and affixing encrypted originator information) are easily circumvented, require significant technical changes to the architecture of messaging services, offer limited investigatory or evidentiary value, and will likely undermine the privacy and security of all users to catch a few bad actors. Given these considerations, it is unlikely that such a measure would satisfy the proportionality test laid out by current Supreme Court doctrine.

Broad and inconsistent injunctions: An analysis of injunctions against online content reveals that the contents of court orders are often sweeping, imposing vague compliance burdens on intermediaries. When issuing injunctions against online content, courts should limit blocking or removals to specific URLs. Further courts should be cognisant of the fact that intermediaries have themselves not committed any wrongdoing, and the effect of an injunction should be seen as meaningfully dissuading users from accessing content rather than an absolute prohibition.

This report was made possible by the generous support we received from National Law University Delhi. CCG would like to thank our Faculty Advisor Dr. Daniel Mathew for his continuous direction and mentorship. This report would not be possible without the support provided by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom, South Asia. We are grateful for comments received from the Data Governance Network and its reviewers. CCG would also like to thank Faiza Rahman and Shashank Mohan for their review and comments, and Jhalak M. Kakkar and Smitha Krishna Prasad for facilitating the report. We thank Oshika Nayak of National Law University Delhi for providing invaluable research assistance for this report. Lastly, we would also like to thank all members of CCG for the many ways in which they supported the report, in particular, the ever-present and ever-patient Suman Negi and Preeti Bhandari for the unending support for all the work we do.

CCG’s Comments to the Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology on the proposed amendments to the Intermediary Guidelines 2021

On 6 June 2022, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (“MeitY”), released the proposed amendments for Part 1 and Part II of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (“2021 IT Rules”). CCG submitted its comments on the proposed amendments to the 2021 IT Rules, highlighting its key feedback and key concerns. The comments were authored by Vasudev Devadasan and Bilal Mohamed and reviewed and edited by Jhalak M Kakkar and Shashank Mohan.

The 2021 IT Rules were released in February last year, and Part I and II of the Guidelines set out the conditions intermediaries must satisfy to avail of legal immunity for hosting unlawful content (or ‘safe harbour’) under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (“IT Act”). The 2021 IT Rules have been challenged in several High Courts across the country, and the Supreme Court is currently hearing a transfer petition on whether these actions should be clubbed and heard collectively by the apex court. In the meantime, the MeitY has released the proposed amendments to the 2021 IT Rules which seek to make incremental but significant changes to the Rules.

CCG’s comments to the MeitY can be summarised as follows:

Dilution of safe harbour in contravention of Section 79(1) of the IT Act

The core intention behind providing intermediaries with safe harbour under Section 79(1) of the IT Act is to ensure that intermediaries do not restrict the free flow of information online due to the risk of being held liable for the third-party content uploaded by users. The proposed amendments to Rules 3(1)(a) and 3(1)(b) of the 2021 IT Rules potentially impose an obligation on intermediaries to “cause” and “ensure” their users do not upload unlawful content. These amendments may require intermediaries to make complex determinations on the legality of speech and cause online intermediaries to remove content that may carry even the slightest risk of liability. This may result in the restriction of online speech and the corporate surveillance of Indian internet users by intermediaries. In the event that the proposed amendments are to be interpreted as not requiring intermediaries to actively prevent users from uploading unlawful content, in such a situation, we note that the proposed amendments may be functionally redundant, and we suggest they be dropped to avoid legal uncertainty.

Concerns with Grievance Appellate Committee

The proposed amendments envisage one or more Grievance Appellate Committees (“GAC”) that sit in appeal of intermediary determinations with respect to content. Users may appeal to a GAC against the decision of an intermediary to not remove content despite a user complaint, or alternatively, request a GAC to reinstate content that an intermediary has voluntarily removed or lift account restrictions that an intermediary has imposed. The creation of GAC(s) may exceed Government’s rulemaking powers under the IT Act. Further, the GAC(s) lack the necessary safeguards in its composition and operation to ensure the independence required by law of such an adjudicatory body. Such independence and impartiality may be essential as the Union Government is responsible for appointing individuals to the GAC(s) but the Union Government or its functionaries or instrumentalities may also be a party before the GAC(s). Further, we note that the originator, the legality of whose content is at dispute before a GAC, has not expressly been granted a right to hearing before the GAC. Finally, we note that the GAC(s) may lack the capacity to deal with the high volume of appeals against content and account restrictions. This may lead to situations where, in practice, only a small number of internet users are afforded redress by the GAC(s), leading to inequitable outcomes and discrimination amongst users.

Concerns with grievance redressal timeline

Under the proposed amendment to Rule 3(2), intermediaries must acknowledge the complaint by an internet user for the removal of content within 24 hours, and ‘act and redress’ this complaint within 72 hours. CCG’s comments note that 72-hour timeline to address complaints proposed by the amendment to Rule 3(2) may cause online intermediaries to over-comply with content removal requests, leading to the possible take-down of legally protected speech at the behest of frivolous user complaints. Empirical studies conducted on Indian intermediaries have demonstrated that smaller intermediaries lack the capacity and resources to make complex legal determinations of whether the content complained against violates the standards set out in Rule 3(1)(b)(i)-(x), while larger intermediaries are unable to address the high volume of complaints within short timelines – leading to the mechanical takedown of content. We suggest that any requirement that online intermediaries address user complaints within short timelines could differentiate between types of content that are ex-facie (on the face of it) illegal and causes severe harm (e.g., child-sex abuse material or gratuitous violence), and other types of content where determinations of legality may require legal or judicial expertise, like copyright or defamation.

Need for specificity in defining due diligence obligations

Rule 3(1)(m) of the proposed amendments requires intermediaries to ensure a “reasonable expectation of due diligence, privacy and transparency” to avail of safe harbour; while Rule 3(1)(n) requires intermediaries to “respect the rights accorded to the citizens under the Constitution of India.” These rules do not impose clearly ascertainable legal obligations, which may lead to increased compliance burdens, hamper enforcement, and results in inconsistent outcomes. In the absence of specific data protection legislation, the obligation to ensure a “reasonable expectation of due diligence, privacy and transparency” is unclear. The contents of fundamental rights obligations were drafted and developed in the context of citizen-State relations and may not be suitable or aptly transposed to the relations between intermediaries and users. Further, the content of ‘respecting Fundamental Rights’ under the Constitution is itself contested and open to reasonable disagreement between various State and constitutional functionaries. Requiring intermediaries to uphold such obligations will likely lead to inconsistent outcomes based on varied interpretations.

Find ways to curb Child Pornography: SC

Today in Court Room no. 4 of the Supreme Court the porn ban petition filed by Kamlesh Vaswani was taken up by the bench of Justices Dipak Mishra and Shiva Kirti Singh.

Mr. Vijay Panjwani, advocate for Mr. Vaswani stated that it has been two years since the petition was filed and the Court issued notices, yet some respondents have not filed their replies.

Ms. Pinky Anand, the Additional Solicitor General of India was representing the Union of India. Ms. Anand submitted that the Court should confine itself to the issues of child pornography as anything beyond that will involve issues of privacy and other rights (in May 2014 the Government had submitted to the Court that a blanket ban on pornography will violate Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution).

However, Justice Mishra in response to that stated that ‘what is the privacy argument? I do not understand what is the privacy issue?’ no one wants to be seen doing this and that if there is any issue the Court can interpret it and deal with it during the arguments.

Subsequently, Justice Shiva Kirti Singh stated that ‘the State should not interfere in every matter’ but only in cases where a crime has been committed.

Agreeing with Justice Singh, Ms. Anand stated that the Centre is concerned about child pornography. She stated that various agencies including Interpol, CBI, the Departments of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY) and Telecom (DoT) of the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology and various Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are working together to come up with mechanisms to deal with child pornography. She explained one of ways to address this. She stated that the CBI will procure a list of child pornography sites from Interpol (more details available here) and pass it to DeitY (more details available here). DeitY will provide a list to DoT which will direct the ISPs to block all these sites. She further stated that most of these materials are generated outside India and it is not possible to have a blanket ban.

She further stated that most of these materials are generated outside India and it is not possible to have a blanket ban.

Mr. Panjwani interjected stating that the ISPs keep raising the argument of free speech but an illegal act cannot be protected under the garb of free speech. He raised the recent JNU example and stated that the Finance Minister stated yesterday in the Parliament that such speech cannot be protected under Right to Freedom of Expression and that his argument is similar to that and pornography cannot be protected under the Right to Freedom of Expression.

Justice Singh asked Mr. Panjwani, how he will define pornography? He subsequently added that it is difficult to define pornography and that someone can find even a picture of Monalisa pornographic.

Mr. Panjwani stated that there is a difference between obscenity and pornography and that there are videos of humans and animals engaging in sexual activities and that it is a cruelty to animals.

Ms. Anand reiterated her point of focusing on child pornography as it may be difficult to find mechanisms for other issues. However, Justice Mishra stated that petitioner’s case is not just about child pornography but all kinds of pornography. He further added that what is not permissible under the India law should not be allowed and the mechanisms to prevent those things can be evolved. He subsequently asked the Government if they were making a distinction between child pornography and adult pornography and to find out from the Ministry if porn can be blocked.

Ms. Anand reiterated the Union’s stand that it is not possible to block porn (the Government has made similar arguments in the past; see here and here). However, Justice Mishra responded that they can block it and that there are means to do it. He added that other countries have not accepted defeat on this issue on the basis of technology and there are ways to deal with it. He added that in a different affidavit filed by the Solicitor General for an authority, it has been stated that this can be blocked. He stated that misogyny, sadism and voyeurism should be prevented online.

Ms. Anand stated that we need to enquire whether the State should in the first place enter this discussion and a personal decision of what a person should watch or not. Whether the State should decide what the moral code of the society is? She said all these are subjective issues and what is pornography and what is not is also subjective.

Justice Mishra said that the there I no subjectivity in it. He stated that obscenity is recognised and punishable by the law. Pornography may or may not be obscene in some contexts, but in videos it will be obscene. Obscenity is linked to misogynism, perversion, sadism, voyeurism. These are the acts depicted in pornography which have a direct nexus with obscenity as crime punishable under Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code. He said there is no subjectivity where it affects the moral code.

Justice Singh added that we should examine what is allowed in public spaces and private spaces. Ms. Anand added to this stating the State cannot interfere with what people consume in the privacy of their homes.

Senior advocate Mahalakshmi Pavani Rao, who was representing the Supreme Court Women Lawyers Association stated that porn is spreading like a moral cancer. She stated that in school bus driver and conductors have porn on their phones and force children to watch it and molest and sodomise them.

Ms. Anand agreed that child pornography is a serious issues and needs to be looked into. However, it may be difficult to look into other issues.

Justice Mishra stated that everyone can start by looking at issues of child pornography first. He said that freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) is not absolute and liberty is not absolute. He said that innocent children cannot be subjected to such painful situations. He added that a nation cannot afford to experiment with its children in the name of liberty and these moral assaults may bring physical disasters with them.

Justice Singh commented that there is a fine line between what is pornography and what is permissible and the Government should try coming up with something to address this. The Bench also asked the ASG to explore whether a ban on consuming pornography in public places can be explored?

The Bench directed the petitioners to provide suggestions to the Government to come up with schemes to tackle child pornography and also allowed the Union to take suggestions from the National Commission of Women. The matter has now been listed for 28^th March 2016.

Government’s Response to Fundamental Questions Regarding the Internet in India

The Ministry of Communication and Information Technology today provided answers to a number of questions, which were raised by the parliamentarians in the Rajya Sabha. We have extracted a set of 6 questions below, that deal with a host of issues including number of blocks under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, the current status of the Central Monitoring System, Data Privacy law and Net Neutrality.

Question 1: (Emergency Blocking under IT Act) 

(a) Whether Government has issued any emergency blocking orders under section 69 (A) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 pursuant to Rule 9 of the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules 2009; and

(b) If so, the total number of emergency blocking orders issued from 1^st January, 2014 till date and the details and specifications thereof?

Answer:

(a) and (b) Government has issued directions for blocking of URLs on emergency basis depending on the nature of contents and consequences of spreading such contents as reported by Law Enforcement and Security Agencies, following the procedure as outlined in Rule 9 of the Information Technology (procedure and Safeguards for blocking for access of Information by Public) Rules.

Emergency blocking orders issued to block a total number of 216 URLs from 1st January, 2014 till date. The information hosted on these URLs were anti-national, provocative, communal hatred, which could lead to serious law and order problem in the Country. The URLs were blocked based on the requests of Law Enforcement Agencies including by orders passed by competent courts, in the interest of Sovereignty and Integrity of India, defense of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the Commission of any cognizable offence relating to above as per the provisions of Section 69A of Information Technology Act, 2000.

Question 2: (Blocking under IT Act)

(a) Whether Government has blocked/disabled access to certain websites and /or Uniform Resource Locators(URLs) during the current year and the last year and if so , the specifications thereof; 

(b) The total number of requests received by the designated officer and the total number of orders issued for blocking of websites and/or content under section 69(A) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 from 1st January, 2014 till date; and

(c) The total number of blocking orders revoked by the Department of Electronics and Information Technology, or any other Government agency from 1st January, 2014 till date?

Answer:

(a) and (b) Government has invoked Section 69A of Information Technology Act, 2000 to block/disable access to certain websites/URLs. Section 69A of the Information Technology Act 2000 empowers Government to block any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any Computer Resource in the interest of Sovereignty and Integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the Commission of any cognizable offence relating to above.

A total of 255 URLs were blocked in 2014 and no URLs has been blocked in 2015 (till 31 March 2015) under Section 69A through the Committee constituted under the rules therein. Further, a total of 2091 URLs and 143 URLs were blocked in order to comply with the Directions of the Competent Courts of India in 2014 and 2015 (till 31 March 2015) respectively.

The Committee constituted as per the rules of Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 had recommended not to block 19 URLs in the meetings held between 1^st January 2014 to till date.

Besides, Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) gets requests for blocking of objectionable content from individuals and organisations, which merely forwards those requests to the concerned websites for appropriate action.

(c) Two orders were issued to revoke the 251 blocked URLs from 1st January 2014 till date.

Question 3: (Central Monitoring System)

(a) The status of implementation of the Central Monitoring System (CMS) set up by Government for lawful interception and monitoring of communications;

(b) The details and salient features of the system, including the nodal agency implementing CMS;

(c) The total expenditure approved and incurred by Government for setting up of CMS;

(d) Whether it is operational, if so, in which parts of the country; and

(e) If not, the time-frame within which setting up and operationalization of CMS across the country is expected to be completed?

Answer:

(a) and (b) Sir, the responsibility for execution of Central Monitoring Systems (CMS) has been entrusted with Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT). Most of Research & Development work has been completed. The Centralized Data Centre has been installed. Interception Store & Forward Servers (ISF) at the premises of Telecom Service Providers have been installed. Civil & electrical related environment works are at final stage of completion for the Regional Monitoring Centres. Installation activities at Regional Monitoring Centres have been initiated. Testing work has been initiated at Centralized Data Centre.

The envisaged salient features of CMS are as follows:

(i) Direct Electronic Provisioning of target number by a Government agency without any manual intervention from Telecom Service Providers (TSPs) on a secured network, thus enhancing the secrecy level and quick provisioning of target.

(ii) Central and regional database which will help Central and State level Law Enforcement Agencies in Interception and Monitoring.

(iii) Analysis of Call Data Records (CDR) to help in establishing linkage between anti-social/anti-national elements.

(iv) Research and Development (R&D) in related fields for continuous up gradation of the CMS.

(c) The CMS project has been approved by Cabinet Committee on Security with Government funding of Rs. 400.00 Crores. The equipment worth Rs. 255 Crores has been purchased and installed against which an amount of Rs. 149 Crores has been paid.

(d) & (e) Presently project is in roll out phase and not operational. The commissioning of CMS Delhi has been planned in phased manner. The Delhi and Karnataka Licensed Service Areas have been planned for initial roll out. 

Question 4: (Multi-Stakeholder model of IG)

(a) The Government’s view on the future on Internet Governance, given its opposition to the widely held multi-stakeholder model propounded at NETmundial;

(b) The Government’s rationale behind not conforming to the Multi-Stakeholder model for Internet Governance put forward at the NETmundial; and

(c) How Government supposes that the Multi-Stakeholder model impedes the principles of being multilateral, transparent, democratic, and representative, with the participation of Governments, private sector, civil society and international organizations?

Answer:

(a), (b) and (c) Government will take a view on the future of Internet Governance taking into account all issues which affect Internet’s growth and India’s interest in the matter.

Question 5: (Data Privacy and IPR Laws)

(a) The steps taken by Government to engage the India-US Working Group on Information and Communication Technologies (WG-ICT) on Digital India initiative thus far;

(b) Whether Government has the requisite measures for data privacy and intellectual property rights of local and foreign manufacturers in place to ensure an attractive IoT Market in India; and

(c) If so, the details thereof?

Answer:

(a) The meeting of the Working Group on Information & Communication Technologies (ICT) was held during 14th -15th January 2015 in Washington DC, USA. Amongst other issues, the two sides discussed cooperation framework under the Digital India Programme. Further a Joint Declaration of Intent for cooperation in the field of Information & Communications Technology and Electronics has been signed between the two countries on 20^th January, 2015. One of the objectives under the aforesaid Joint Declaration of Intent is to explore the opportunities for collaboration in the course of implementation of India’s ambitious Digital India programme.

(b) and (c) The Information Technology Act, 2000 has adequate provisions for data protection and data privacy in digital form. Sections 43, 43A and 72A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 provides a legal framework for privacy and security of data in digital form. Further, Indian laws relating to Intellectual Property Right have been suitably amended and are TRIPS compliant

Question 6: (Net Neutrality and OTT Services)

(a) Whether there have been reports of private operators attempting to charge consumers premium rates for the use of services provided by Over-The-Top players;

(b) If so, the details thereof;

(c) The steps being taken by the Ministry to protect consumers from similar attempts in future; and

(d) the steps being taken by the Ministry to safeguard investor sentiment in the telecom sector?

Answer:

(a) & (b) Telecom Regulatory Authority of India has reported that M/s. Bharti Airtel Limited reported that effective from 23.12.2014, all internet/data packs or plans (through which consumers can avail discounted rate) will exclude Voice Over Internet Protocol (both incoming and outgoing) and standard data rates will be applicable for VoIP. Subsequently, M/s. Bharti Airtel limited reported withdrawal of the same with effect from 26.12.2014.

(c) Does not arise in view of (a) & (b).

(d) Telecom licenses are governed by license agreements which are entered by Department of Telecom (licensor) with telecom service providers (licensees). At present 100% Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is permitted in the telecom services sector, with 49% through automatic route and beyond 49% through Government route.

Both the domestic as well as Foreign Investors have to follow the laws of the land and are treated at par. As far as FDI is concerned, the investment is protected through Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements signed by India with 72 countries.

—-

(Sarvjeet is a Project Manager and Research Fellow at the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University, Delhi)

Symposium on Human Rights and the Internet in India

Symposium on Human Rights & the Internet in India

discussing

Surveillance & Databases: Experiences & Privacy Concerns

&

Unpacking the Intermediary Liability Debate in India

5:00 p.m., 17^th January 2015

Organised by

Global Network of Internet and Society Research Centers

UNESCO Chair on Freedom of Communication and Information at the University of Hamburg

Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society (HIIG)

Hans Bredow Institute, University of Hamburg

&

Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University, Delhi

at

Conference Room – II | India International Centre | Max Muller Marg | Lodhi Estate | New Delhi

On January 17, 2015 the Center for Communication Governance at National Law University, Delhi in collaboration with the UNESCO Chair on Freedom of Communication and Information at the University of Hamburg host a pubic symposium on “Human Rights and Internet in India” as a Network of Centers (NoC) regional event. The event convenes a diverse group of collaborators working on issues of Privacy, Surveillance, Data Protection, Freedom of Expression and Intermediary Liability in India, the surrounding region, and internationally.

The concept note for the event can be found here.

Agenda | Saturday, January 17 | Public Symposium

17:20 – 17:45 Welcome
Opening words
Prof. (Dr.) Ranbir Singh, Vice Chancellor, National Law University, Delhi
Prof. (Dr.) Wolfgang Schulz, Director, Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet & Society

17:45 – 19:00 Panel I: Surveillance & Databases: Experiences & Privacy
The panel will explore how surveillance in India might become more consistent with international human rights standards and Indian constitutional values. It will also discuss the consequences of ubiquitous database programs for citizens’ human rights. This will include comparative perspectives around similar problems and a discussion of privacy-compatible practices in other countries.

Panelists:
Dr. Usha Ramanathan, Independent Law Researcher

Mr. Bhairav Acharya, Lawyer, Supreme Court of India and Adviser Centre for Internet & Society, Bangalore

Mr. Saikat Datta, Editor (National Security), Hindustan Times

Professor KS Park, Former Commissioner, Korea Communications Standards Commission and Professor, Korea University Law School
 
19:00 – 20:15 Panel II: Unpacking the Intermediary Liability Debate in India
The panel will focus on the legal framework governing Internet platforms in India, especially with regard to online content and its implications for rights of the citizens. It has been argued that the current legal framework creates incentives for online intermediaries to take down content even when no substantive notice or legitimate reasons have been offered. The panel will consider the debate around intermediary liability in India in light of the ongoing litigation at the Supreme Court. It will reflect on the international experience with intermediary liability legislation and discuss how to ensure that laws support an innovative and competitive environment for intermediaries, while ensuring that they prioritize the preservation of their users’ human rights.
 
Panelists:
Dr. Joris van Hoboken, Fellow, Information Law Institute at NYU School of Law

Professor (Dr.) Wolfgang Schulz, Director, Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet & Society (HIIG)

Mr. Raman Jit Singh Chima, Lawyer

Chinmayi Arun and Sarvjeet Singh, Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University, Delhi 

20:15 onwards: Dinner