A Constitutional Right against Free Basics? The Link between Article 19 and Zero Rating

Written by Siddharth Manohar

The past month has witnessed a rise in tide of public debate surrounding net neutrality once more, accompanying the release of another Consultation Paper by TRAI, and another AIB video urging public participation in the ongoing consultation process. To add to this mix there has also been an effort from Facebook to build consensus amongst its userbase regarding the effect of ‘Free Basics’ on net neutrality. The crux of one set of arguments put forth in these debates consists of the harm that a differentially priced platform can cause to competition in the market for Internet applications, along with the related concern of monopolization of a section of the country’s userbase. The other side places emphasis on the need to increase the accessibility of the Internet, and both have disagreements as to the interpretation of the term ‘net neutrality’.

An important issue that gets missed out in the rhetoric is the Fundamental right of Internet users to access a diverse set of media sources on any given platform whose nature is that of a public utility. Media diversity implies that the information stream reaching the public through any public medium must be prevented from being unduly influenced by one or a few entities with a controlling effect on the market for these media content providers. It also rules against any role for the carriers of content (known usually as intermediaries or service providers) in choosing whose or what kind of content is allowed on the medium. The usage and allocation of the medium as a public resource is subject to certain Constitutional principles as well, and these are also ignored while discussing how to regulate (or not) Internet-related services in India.

The Right to be Informed

Article 19 of the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of expression, but this right also includes the right of citizens to a plural media. As discussed by the Supreme Court in Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India v. Cricket Association of Bengal, the debate and opinions sought to be protected by Article 19 need to be informed by a plurality of views and an ‘aware citizenry’. What does this mean for regulation of access to the Internet? It translates into ensuring the possibility of a wide array of options in terms of media consumer choices being made available to the public. Any communication platform cannot remain restricted in its control by one or a few parties. This restricts the nature of the content available through that media, leading to narrowing of the ideas views available to citizens on any public platform.

It is far from difficult to balance this concern with the free market. The principle encourages a competitive atmosphere between content providers, and seeks to avoid a situation where there is a disproportionately dominant player in the market exerting undue influence over the functioning of that market. The presence of a single or few dominant entity(ies) enjoying a magnified impact on the market makes it difficult for newer entrants to make a dent in the market-share of the dominant player, thus reducing the possibility of any competition being provided by these smaller players.

This Constitutional requirement comes in conflict with the concept of zero-rated plans at its core: can we really have a telecom company deciding the exact specific pieces of content that we receive in preference to all other content? Are we willing to hand them this power of shaping consumer choice, public access and opinion simply by choosing the right business partners? If we can conclusively answer these questions in the affirmative, zero-rating plans would have no quarrel with Article 19. Indeed, such an affirmation would even successfully dispense with one of the core tenants of the idea of net neutrality – that all data be treated in the same manner irrespective of its content.

Spectrum as a Public Resource

The Cricket Association of Bengal judgment also discusses the regulation of spectrum as a public resource. This is arguably an even more fundamental question, addressing the question of what qualifies as legitimate usage and allocation of spectrum. The Court characterized airwaves as a scarce public resource, which ought to be used in the best interests of the public, and in a manner that prevents any infractions on their rights. Justice Reddy’s opinion in the judgment even acknowledges the requirement of media plurality as part of the required policy approach for regulating spectrum.

Another SC judgment arguing in a similar vein, Association of Unified Tele Services Providers & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., ruled that the State is bound to use spectrum resources solely for the enjoyment of the general public. Applying the public trust doctrine, it explained that the resources are prohibited from being used or transferred for any kind of private or commercial interest.

What the available jurisprudence effectively lays down can be encapsulated in the following: Spectrum is a public resource that can only be used and/or allocated by the state for general public benefit, and cannot be used in any manner for private or commercial interests. This public interest contains various concerns, one of them being the right to a diverse set of media content sources, so as to avoid interested parties having any kind of power or control over the content available to consumers. What this means for the State is that spectrum must be used in order to maximise the variety of media available to end-users and prohibit control over the medium of transmission being controlled by a single or few player(s).

This creates a tricky situation for TRAI, who have asked for public comments on the desirability of differential pricing in data services. There is a glaring lack of clarity on the exact mandate provided to the state regarding how to use spectrum resources to achieve TRAI’s officially cited objective of providing ‘free’ Internet access to consumers. Without discussion focusing on the exact nature of what we want to achieve, we will continue to be forced take reactionary positions regarding most issues and developments. Forming a concrete policy to connect India’s billion can only get a whole lot easier once we are able to agree upon a common goal and a set of principles regarding how to get there.

Image Credit: Everybody Loves Eric Raymond: http://geekz.co.uk/lovesraymond/

Information Gatekeepers and Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution

I have put a draft of my paper titled ‘Gatekeeper Liability and Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution on SSRN. You can read it here. It will eventually be published in the NUJS Law Review.

Alternatively, this essay (written for a UPenn/ CIS/ ORF publication) based on the paper sets out my argument briefly.

Introduction

The press was once the most important medium of mass communication. Indira Gandhi understood this well and used the gatekeeping function of large media houses to prevent citizens from accessing critical information. The press’s function as an information gatekeeper is protected by jurisprudence, but this protection is articulated as ‘freedom of the press’, making it a medium-specific protection. As the Internet increasingly replaces the press as the most important source of information for citizens, structural protections need to extend online. The online intermediary may be the new avatar of the information gatekeeper, third parties who perform an essential function in transmitting information from speakers to audiences – they are potential choke points that the state can use to cut off flows of information.

Aside from the press freedom norms, much of our freedom of expression jurisprudence deals with the state’s relationship with the speaker. The contours of our freedom of expression rights have formed in this context. It is relatively easy for the judiciary to grasp how statutory provisions like section 66A of the Information Technology Act impact freedom of expression. Here the law targets the speaker directly and any unjust application or chilling effect is more visible. It is also more likely to be resisted by the target of regulation, since the speaker is always interested in her own right to speak.

Indirect regulation of speech is quite different. The law is aimed at information gatekeepers, who may choose not to publicise censorship and who may not be as interested in protected the speech as the original speaker. Scholars have described these gatekeepers as the ‘weakest link’, through which speech is most vulnerable to state excesses.

Information gatekeepers and Indian law

It is common enough for states to use ‘middle-men’ to enforce change in behaviour when it is difficult to control the primary offender’s conduct directly. For example, since it is difficult to directly compel minors to avoid drinking, the law targets alcohol-sellers, leveraging their gatekeeping function to cut off the supply of alcohol to minors.

Information gatekeepers were used to regulate the flow of information even in the pre-digital world. Publishers and booksellers were held liable for circulating banned publications in many countries including India. India has a particularly pernicious rule criminalizing the circulation of obscene content. This comes from the Supreme Court’s judgment in Ranjit Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, that is well known for its interpretation of obscenity law in the context of D.H. Lawrence’s ‘Lady Chatterley’s Lover’. The other critical element of this judgment received almost no attention – the liability of a bookseller for the circulation of obscene content.

D.H. Lawrence was never prosecuted in India for his book. The ‘Lady Chatterley’s Lover’ case in the Supreme Court was about the liability of the owners of Happy Book Stall, a bookshop at which ‘Lady Chatterley’s Lover’ was sold. The Supreme Court said the booksellers were liable for circulation of the obscene content even if they argued that they were unaware that a book contained such content. Consider what this means: booksellers cannot plead ignorance of obscene content within any of the books they sell, and will be liable nonetheless. The state only has to prove that the booksellers circulated obscene content, and not that they did so knowingly. It is lucky that this part of the Supreme Court judgment went largely unnoticed since it could easily be used by the intolerant file criminal complaints that shut down large bookstores all over the country – all they need to do is look for a few books that the law would categorise as obscene. Booksellers would then have to scour every page and paragraph of each book they sell to weed it out content that might get them arrested – this would make it very difficult to do business.

Online intermediaries as information gatekeepers

Intermediary liability first received attention in India after the infamous ‘DPS-MMS’ explicit video, featuring two minors, ended up being sold on Baazee.com. The Managing Director of the company that owned the website was arrested. The fact that he had no knowledge that this content was shared on the website was irrelevant thanks to the Supreme Court’s ‘Lady Chatterley’s Lover’ verdict. This situation made it clear that if the law applicable to bookshops continued to apply to online intermediaries, online platforms would not be able to function in India. A platform like Facebook or Youtube hosts too much user content to be able to sift through it and proactively filter out everything obscene.

Fortunately, the amendment of the Information Technology Act (IT Act) gave Internet intermediaries immunity from this liability for third party content. The immunity was conditional. Intermediaries that edit or otherwise have knowledge of the content that they transmit are not immune from liability. To remain immune from liability, intermediaries must comply with certain legal obligations to take down content or block it in response to government orders or court orders. These obligations also leverage the gate-keeping function of these intermediaries to regulate online content – internet service providers and online platforms can ensure that certain kinds of content are inaccessible in India.

Why gatekeepers matter

Although information intermediaries existed in the pre-internet information ecosystem, their role is critical in the context of online content – several intermediaries mediate our access to online content. Some of these, like the gateways through which the Indian network connects to the global network, are located in India and are easy for the government to control since they are subject to onerous licenses and are few enough in number for the state to be able to control all of them successfully. Other intermediaries like Facebook or Google, are online platforms, and most of these have offices outside Indian jurisdiction.

Discussions about freedom of expression that focus on the direct relationship between the state and the speaker are not helpful in this context. This kind of reasoning tends to ignore the collateral effects of certain kinds of regulation of speech – the ‘Lady Chatterley’s Lover’ case case is a classic illustration of this with its tremendous impact on the liability of all booksellers and later on Baazee.com and other web based platforms.

As the new media make gatekeepers and intermediaries more critical to the controlling the flow of information, we need to focus on other dimensions of freedom of expression if we are ensure that effective safeguards are put in place to protect speech. Our jurisprudence on freedom of the press offers some degree of protection to newspapers so that regulation of their business structure cannot be used to influence their content, but this form of gatekeeper protection is limited to the press. There are information gatekeepers other than the press in India, and it is time that we think carefully about protecting the information ecosystem. Free speech principles need to accommodate themselves to a media ecosystem that is increasingly dependent on information gatekeepers.

Freedom of expression and access to information

It is time that our jurisprudence started focusing more on citizens’ rights to access information. Although this right that has been recognized in India, it needs to be outlined in more detail. In the well-known judgment in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, which struck down section 66A of the Information Technology Act, the Supreme Court failed to deal with intermediary liability adequately because it did not use the lens of access to information and gatekeeper liability. Using traditional jurisprudence that focuses on the direct impact of regulation of speech, the court gave content-creators the right to a hearing and a right to appeal blocks and removals of their content wherever possible. However, it completely disregarded the rights of citizens to access online content.

The content blocking system in India makes all government blocking orders confidential. This means that when an intermediary is required to block content under the IT Act, users might imagine that the decision was a private decision made by the intermediary. Since the intermediary is unlikely to be willing to spend resources battling for the various kinds of content it hosts, any blocking process that counts on the intermediary to offer up sufficient resistance to unconstitutional blocking orders errs egregiously. The law must offer those who are actually affected – the publishers and the readers of the information – a chance to fight for content that they have the right to circulate and access. Of these, the publishers of information do have some right to make their case before the government committee making the blocking decision thanks to the Supreme Court’s decision in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India. But this judgment does nothing for citizens who could lose access to a wealth of information if the government might unreasonably blocks content created by someone in another country. The content publisher would not be in a position to defend its content in India, and citizens have not been given any avenue to defend their rights to view the content before the government committee making the decision.

The focus on access to information has been discussed many scholars, from Alexander Meiklejohn onwards. Amartya Sen has written about the salience of public discourse in a democracy. Robert Post and Jack Balkin have articulated in the detail the importance of focusing on the free flow of information or access to information, rather than on the right of individual speakers. The right we refer to as ‘freedom of expression’ is about much more than the freedom to say what one pleases. It is the foundational principle from which our rules about free flow of information have been built.

Conclusion

Section 66A was an example of what Jack Balkin characterises as ‘old school’ regulation of speech. This consists of criminal penalties, injunction and damages aimed directly at the speaker or publisher. The Supreme Court’s treatment of section 66A reflects its comfort with this form of regulation and its implications for freedom of expression.

Intermediary liability, and the use of Internet gatekeepers to control the flow of online information follows a different system: it uses control over the infrastructure or platforms of speech to exercise control over speech. Jack Balkin characterizes this as ‘new school’ regulation. Through ‘collateral censorship’, a third party is made to block or remove a primary speaker or publisher’s speech. For example, a government order or a court order requiring that certain online content be blocked, does this by requiring and internet service provider or online platform to censor the information. New school regulation works necessitates co-operation of these third party intermediaries like internet service providers and online platforms with the government, and this can be achieved by compelling them to co-operate through the law or by using softer means to co-opt them.

New school regulation must be assessed in terms of the collateral harm that it causes. It is not a question of whether online pornography should be blocked or not anymore. It is a question of whether the process used to get intermediaries to block the pornography can be abused to block constitutionally protected speech. We have already recognized the collateral effects of structural regulation in the context of press freedom, and the Supreme Court has barred certain kinds of structural interference with the media that might impact their reporting. It is time to create a version of this principle for online speech, and to think in terms of access and free flow of information.

References

Ranjit Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India

Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India v. Cricket Association of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161.

Sakal Papers v Union of India

Amartya Sen, Idea of Justice, 321-337 (2009)

Chinmayi Arun, Gatekeeper Liability and Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, NUJS Law Review [forthcoming-2015]

Jack Balkin, ‘Old School/ New-School Speech Regulation’, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 2296

Jack Balkin, ‘The first amendment is an information policy’, Hofstra Law Review 41 (2013)

Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 Virginia L. Rev. 3 (2011).

Seth Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: the First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository (2006)

We are not a totalitarian state and cannot be asked to moral police: AG tells SC in the Porn Petition

The Kamlesh Vaswani matter that has asked the Court to direct the Government to block all pornography over the Internet and was used conveniently by the Government to order the disablement of over 850 website last week came up before the bench headed by the Chief Justice today.

Image: https://lmindia2.global.ssl.fastly.net/sites/lovematters_india/files/styles/medium/public/field/image/porn_dos_and_donts.jpg?itok=u2h406Wf

Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, the Attorney General of India represented the Union along with ASG Ms. Pinky Anand. He stated that after the last hearing the petitioners gave a list of 857 websites to the Government, which were blocked by the Department without any verification. Subsequently, the Department verified the list and then asked the Internet Service Providers to only block websites with child porn.

He said that if someone wants to watch porn in the confines of their bedroom how can we interfere. He subsequently stated that there are various kinds of pornography- hard-core, soft, violent porn. At this juncture the Chief Justice quipped ‘Mr. Rohatgi how do you know all this’, to which the AG replied ‘your lordship I have not watched it, but I do plan to, since that is the only way to understand the concerns, moreover my juniors are very tech savy’. He also stated that pornography is a grey area and there are no straight answers.

The AG argued that the geographical frontiers are no frontiers on the Internet and it is a borderless space, and it is very difficult to block anything on it. He said that if we block ten sites another five would pop up with new names at new locations.

He again reiterated that if someone wants to watch this in the privacy of their bedroom, the state cannot be a moral police or enter peoples bedrooms. He added that there are issues of freedom of speech and expression under article 19(1)(a) involved in the case.

The AG stated that the Government is committed to Internet freedom and has launched the ambitious Digital India project, which aims to connect crores of people to the Internet. He added that the MyGov website is becoming the converging point of lots of people to send ideas to the Government and connect with it.

He stated that the petitioner’s argument that the law as it stands today is ineffective and thus unconstitutional is not a valid argument. He cited an example of a case of customs officers in Mumbai who were booked as they were watching porn within a bungalow and the High Court acquitted them, as that is not an offence. He stated that the case is pending before the Supreme Court.

The AG submitted that there is no doubt that child porn has to be banned and the Government will make every effort to do that. However, he added that effective banning on the Internet is very difficult. He also stated that sites these days pick up profiles of the surfer and then the person gets targeted advertising, which the Government cannot block and we are not willing to take up the mantle of moral policing.

He stated that as of today our position is that child porn needs to be banned, beyond that if someone gives us a site which has child porn we will block it or block sites based on court orders as laid down in Shreya Singhal. Beyond that this issue is a larger debate, which can happen in court or outside it in Parliament or in the society.

At this point Mr. Vaswani’s lawyer, Vijay Panjwani stated that a criminal activity is a criminal activity whether in public or in private and transmission of pornography is a criminal activity, which the ISPs are doing. He added that we have the technology to block these sites, parties including people from Banaras Hindu University have filed affidavits in the case stating the same. He said that there is a seven-years imprisonment for anyone transmitting absence content under the Information Technology Act, but we are not even asking for that, we are just asking for the sites to be blocked.

The Attorney General interrupted at this point and stated that today every computer has a child/parental lock and can be used to limit children’s access to such sites and there are other softwares being developed for mobiles and other devices.

He added that the best filter is not to block this content at the gateway but if individuals want they can do it on their devices, as if two adults want to watch it for entertainment we cannot enter their houses. The AG further stated that we cannot become a totalitarian state and there is right to information and entertainment under article 19(1)(a).

Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Senior Advocate being briefed by AoR Mr. Rahul Narayan appearing for the Internet Service Providers Association of India argued that there is a conflict between the two orders issues by the DoT on 31^st July and 4^th August 2015. She added that ISPs are not responsible for the content added by intermediaries.

The first order asked ISPs to disable 857 websites, but the subsequent orders asked us to unblock 857 URLs. She stated that there is a difference between a website and a URL and added that we will block whatever we are asked to under the law and our license agreements but we need to have clear instructions regarding what needs to be blocked. The Government cannot ask us to identify and block content and that is unreasonable burden on the ISPs.

The CJI speaking for the bench stated that we have never passed any order in this case or asked for any blocking. The AG agreed with the Court and stated that since there has been no order by the Court, he will ask the Department of Telecom (DoT) and Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY) to meet with ISAPI and sort out the difficulties.

The AG informed the court that they are working on some self-regulation mechanisms and requested to court to list the matter in October.

(Sarvjeet is a Senior Fellow & Project Manager at the Centre)

Busy Day for Free Speech in the Supreme Court: Defamation and Pornography

Image: http://www.internetlawcommentary.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/defame530.jpg

Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India

The Supreme Court bench of Justices Dipak Misra and Prafulla Pant today heard a bunch of almost two-dozen petitions, which challenge the constitutional validity of criminal defamation (sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code). Among the more prominent ones are petitions from Mr. Subramanian Swamy, Mr. Rahul Gandhi, Mr. Rajdeep Sardesai and Mr. Arvind Kejriwal, whose government incidentally days after him challenging the validity of criminal defamation came out with a circular “to deal with instances of defamatory imputations covered under Sec 499/500 of IPC against the CM and ministers”.

Attorney General Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Additional Solicitor General Mr. PS Narasimha represented the Union of India. The Attorney General at the outset requested the court to refer the matter to a constitutional bench as per Article 145(3) of the Indian Constitution. The bench however did not seem very inclined and provided examples of multiple cases in the recent past including Suresh Kumar Koushal and Shreya Singhal which were decided by a two judge bench. In response the Attorney General submitted that if in other instances the correct course was not followed, that should not be a reason to not refer the matter in the present case. Mr. TR Andhyarujina, who has been appointed as an amicus in the case also supported the Attorney General’s contention. The Court has allowed the Union of India to raise this issue in their final arguments and has agreed to answer it in the final judgment.

The bench clarified that it will only be dealing with the issue of constitutionality of sections 499 and 500 of IPC and will not look into how these sections are applied. The bench also stated that it cannot abolish a provision as that is the job of the parliament, it can only look at the constitutionality of the provision.

Mr. Andhyarujina informed the court that among the various terms mentioned under Article 19(2) of the Constitution there is no judgment on the issue of defamation and what the court needs to decide is whether the right to freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) is inhibited by defamation being a penal provision.

The Attorney General also dealt with the issue of criminal and civil defamation and stated that a civil suit for damages in such instances keeps pending for years and there is hardly any award provided, nor is there any deterrence effect whereas criminal provision at least has some deterrence effect. He also compared the situation to the English system and was supported by Mr. Andhyarujina and both of them stated that unlike the India system its easy to approach the civil court for damages in such cases and obtain a relief whereas in India the system should be kept in mind. However, the bench reiterated that it will only examine the constitutionality of the sections and the system that exists for civil defamation and the time taken to decide such suits will have no bearing on that.

Mr. Andhyarujina stated that theses sections are used as an inhibitor for freedom of speech and expression specially in political context, to which the court stated that different people have different views regarding the validity of the provisions under Article 19(2) including the two amicus appointed by the Court and the matter should be carefully considered.

The bench specifically asked the amicus to assist the court with two questions. Firstly, whether sections 499 and 500 can be read down if required and secondly, whether the fact that there has been a trend of some countries abolishing criminal defamation will have any impact on this court deciding the constitutional validity of a statutory provisions in light of our written and organic constitution.

The court has directed the Union of India to file a counter by 11^th July and all the petitioners to file their propositions of law by 14^th July which is the next date of hearing.

Kamlesh Vaswani v. Union of India

Image: http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/03343/ChrissyChambers_En_3343155k.jpg

The Kamlesh Vaswani matter that has asked the Court to direct the Government to block all pornography over the Internet came up before the bench headed by the Chief Justice today. The petitioner stated that they have filed an affidavit highlighting the issue of revenge porn. The Court agreed with the seriousness of the matter and agreed to look at the issue of revenge porn. However, the Chief Justice refused to passed any interim order in the matter and stated that the Court cannot interfere in what adults do inside the four walls of their house and doing so may be violate of their Article 21 rights. The bench has asked the Union to file it’s reply in four weeks.

(Sarvjeet is a Project Manager & Fellow at the Centre)

Cases in which the Supreme Court will consider the validity of Criminalization of Defamation

The Supreme Court of India is currently hearing a bunch of petitions challenging the validity of Sections 499 and 500 of IPC among others.

PICTURE: http://law.famu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/defamation.jpg

The Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University, Delhi will been tracking the case and is collecting various documents relating to it.

NOTE: There are 25 petitions which have been tagged together- the latest list of petitions can be found at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BycAZd9M5_7NbWhubWo5eU92OTA/view?usp=sharing. 

We are in the process of finding out the details of the lawyers and other documents regarding the same.

The details and other information regarding the cases is available below. (The table is not exhaustive as we are still collecting information)

If you have any information or copy of petitions or submissions please mail them to sarvjeet.singh@nludelhi.ac.in

Name of Case	Number	Lawyers Appearing for the petitioner	Amicus	Copy of the petition	Copy of the written submission
Subramanian Swamy v. UOI, Ministry of Law & Justice & ors.	W.P. (Crl.) No. 184/2014	Mr. Subramanian Swamy (petitioner in person) Mr. G.S. Mani (Senior Advocate) Mr. A. Lakshminarayanan Mr. M. M. Kashyap	Mr. T.R. Andharujina (Senior Advocate) Mr. K. Parasaran (Senior Advocate)
Arvind Kerjiwal v. UOI, Ministry of Law & Justice & ors.	W.P. (Crl.) No. 56/2015	Dr.   Rajeev Dhavan (Senior Advocate) Ms.   Vrinda Bhandari Mr.   Chirag M. Shroff Ms.   Swati Vaibhav		Available here
Arvind Kerjiwal v. UOI & ors.	W.P. (Crl.) No. 62/2015	Mr.   Arvind P. Datar (Senior Advocate) Mr.   Guru Krishna Kumar (Senior Advocate) Mr.   Trideep Pais Mr.   Gautam
Rahul Gandhi v. UOI & ors.	W.P. (Crl.) No. 67/2015	Mr.   P.P. Rao (Senior Advocate) Mr.   Harin P. Raval (Senior Advocate) Mr.   R.S. Cheema (Senior Advocate) Ms.   Mahalakshmi Pavani (Senior Advocate) Mr.   K.C. Mittal Mr.   G. Balaji Ms.   Tarannum Cheema Mr. Nipun Saxena Mr.   Santosh Krishnan
Foundation for Media Professionals v. UOI	W.P. (Crl.) No. 106/2015	Mr. Anup Bhambhani (Senior Advocate) Mr.Dushyant Arora Ms. Mudrika Bansal Mr. Apar Gupta		Available here

Supreme Court adjourns hearing of Ratan Tata’s Privacy Petition

The writ petition (398/2010) filed by Mr. Ratan Tata against the violation of his right to privacy came up for hearing before a Supreme Court bench on 26^th August 2014. According to the cause list the matter was listed before a three judge bench of Justices HL Dattu, SA Bobde and Abhay Manohar Sapre. However, due to administrative reasons the composition of the bench was changed from 3 to 2 judges.

The new bench composed of Justices HL Dattu and SA Bobde agreed that the case involves important questions of law with respect to Articles 19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution. The bench has listed the matter for directions before a 3 judge bench on 9^th September 2014.

Mr. Tata had filed the petition after his conversations with corporate lobbyist Niira Radia were leaked and published in some magazines and on their websites in 2010. Tata has termed it an invasion of his right to privacy. The petition seeks to protect the privacy of individuals and asks the court to frame guidelines on conversations tapped by government agencies. A statement issued by Tata Sons at that time stated that “Mr Ratan Tata has filed this writ petition on a matter of principle. He believes privacy is an important right for every individual and is keenly following the progress of this case”. Senior Counsel Mr. Harish Salve is representing Mr. Tata in the matter.

(Sarvjeet is a Project Manager and Research Fellow at the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University, Delhi)

Panel Discussion on ‘Intermediary Liability & Freedom of Expression in India’

Panel Discussion on ‘Intermediary Liability & Freedom of Expression in India’

6:00 p.m., 26th March 2014

Organised by

The Global Network Initiative, Washington DC

&

Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University, Delhi

at

Lecture Room – I | India International Centre Annexe | Joseph Stein Lane, Lodhi Estate, Max Muller Marg | New Delhi

The panel will focus on the Indian legal framework governing Internet platforms, especially with regard to online content and its implications for citizens rights. India has seen significant debate with respect to Internet intermediaries and the balance that should be involved in regulations affecting user-generated content. It has been argued that the current legal framework creates incentives for online intermediaries to take down content even when no substantive notice or legitimate reasons have been offered, and despite the fact that this content may actually be highly relevant for public communication and proper democratic functioning.

The panel will explore these questions in the context of the civil liberties that are key to democracy, especially free expression and privacy. It will draw connections between this ostensibly Internet-related issue, and the traditional media, tohighlight recurring issues and useful perspectives.

Welcome Address:

– Prof. (Dr.) Ranbir Singh, Vice Chancellor, NLU, Delhi

Panelists:

–       Jermyn Brooks, Outgoing Independent Chair, Global Network Initiative, Washington DC

–       Shyam Divan, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India

–       Siddharth Varadarajan, Journalist & Senior Fellow, Centre for Public Affairs and Critical Theory, New Delhi