Transparency and Diversity in the 2017 MAG Renewal

By Puneeth Nagaraj

Two days before the ongoing MAG meeting, the 2017 MAG renewal was announced. The CSCG protested the lack of civil society representatives among the new MAG members. This brought back focus on the need for MAG reform. Our report on multistakeholderism had identified the lack of transparency and geographic diversity in MAG selections. These issues remain relevant as another set of MAG meetings kick off in Geneva.

The Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) was renewed for 2017 on Monday. The renewal has attracted controversy as no civil society members were added to this year’s MAG. The announcement has brought into focus a persistent criticism on the lack of transparency in the MAG nomination process. The lack of transparency and geographic diversity in the MAG was discussed in our report on multistakeholderism. Some of its findings are relevant to the 2017 MAG renewal.

Created on the recommendation of the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), the MAG is responsible for organising the annual IGF. The MAG is not a decision-making body by design. But  Jeremy Malcolm  (pp. 420-422) points out  that the MAG effectively chooses issues that are debated on a global stage in the course of organising the IGF. In this respect, he argues that the MAG plays an important agenda setting role in internet governance.

MAG Nomination Process and Transparency

The make-up of the MAG is similar to the WGIG in that consists of representatives of all stakeholder groups (government, private sector, civil society and technical community). The selection of MAG members is made by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) under the authority of the UN Secretary General. Nominations to the UN DESA are made through focal points from different stakeholder groups, but applicants can also apply to the UN DESA directly.

As noted in our report (pp. 70-72), once nominations are sent to the UN DESA, there is no clarity on how members are selected to the MAG. The only available information on DESA’s selection criteria are the five criteria listed on the IGF website. These criteria include achieving a geographic and gender balance and that representatives should have strong linkages to their stakeholder groups.

The controversy in this year’s MAG renewal arose out of the lack of new civil society representation on the MAG. The Civil Society Coordination Group (CSCG), which is the focal point for civil society nominations wrote to the IGF secretariat asking it to reconsider its decision. They pointed out that no civil society members were added to the MAG this year despite two civil society members retiring from the MAG (members are selected for 3 year terms and a third of the MAG retires each year). The letter also called on the IGF secretariat to select an additional civil society member to the MAG.

This is not the first time that MAG nominations have been controversial. In 2016, the CSCG wrote to the IGF secretariat asking for greater transparency and inclusiveness in selections to the MAG. Similarly, as discussed in our report (p. 73), an Indian civil society member nominated by the CSCG was not selected to the MAG in 2014. In the above cases, the CSCG had contacted IGF secretariat asking for greater clarity on how selections were made.

Geographic Diversity

One of the findings of our report with respect to the MAG was on the geographic diversity of the group. As mentioned above, geographic diversity is one of the stated criteria based on which the UN DESA selects members to the MAG. Our report found that on average, 8-10% of MAG members were from the United States (based on their affiliation mentioned on the IGF website). As shown in the chart below, this was the highest percentage representation from any country between 2011 and 2015.

Membership by country as a percentage of total MAG Membership (2011-15)

Source: Multistakeholderism in Action

This trend has continued in the 2017 MAG renewal with 4 members or 7% of the MAG being from the United States. No other country has more than 2 members in the current MAG. The FAQ section on MAG renewals acknowledges this disparity. It stated that the MAG currently has an excess of members from Western Europe and Others Group. It also states that a new selection process will attempt to make the MAG more regionally balanced. It remains to be seen if this imbalance will be addressed in the next MAG renewal cycle.

The MAG nomination process raises questions on the transparency of the process and the diversity within the MAG. However, there is very little publicly available information or communication from the UN DESA beyond the criteria listed on the IGF website. The 2017 announcement was made one day before the IGF Open Consultations and MAG meeting were to begin in Geneva (1^st March). A CSCG representative who circulated the letter believed that the issue of non-selection of a civil society member might be taken up at the meeting.

Puneeth Nagaraj is a Project Managers at the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi

India and Internet Governance: The Challenge of Multistakeholderism

By Puneeth Nagaraj

The recent signing of the US-India Cyber framework capped off a landmark year in India’s digital diplomacy. In addition to bilateral agreements, India played an important role in negotiations at international fora like the Ten Year Review of the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS+10 Review) and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). India’s increasing interest in internet governance suggests that it is a priority area for the government. However, as our report on multistakeholderism suggests, there is a need for a domestic multistakeholder setup that supports India’s international engagements on internet governance.

The global internet governance regime has for long been the site of a contentious debate between multilateral and multistakeholder forms of governance. In their simplest form, multilateralism privileges the role of governments while the multistakeholderism accords an equal role to all stakeholders in the governance of the internet. In the last year, India has reiterated its support for the multistakeholder model of governance at ICANN, the WSIS+10 Review and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). As a key swing state in these debates, India’s position has been instrumental in moving the debate in favour of multistakeholderism.

Across fora, multistakeholderism is emerging as the de facto model of governance. However, our report has found that there has been limited participation from Indian stakeholders at three internet governance institutions over the last 5 years. To have greater impact at these institutions, there needs to be greater engagement of Indian stakeholders from across stakeholder groups. This is only possible if there is a domestic multistakeholder environment that encourages greater participation of Indian stakeholders while also serving as a discursive space for policy discussions. The India Internet Governance Forum, conceived in 2013 is a multistakeholder body that was supposed to fill this gap. Three years on, it is yet to take shape and it is unclear as to why this is the case.

Multistakeholderism and India

There is some debate on the meaning of multistakeholderism, as the various internet governance institutions follow different models of multistakeholder governance. From ICANN, which is now administered by a ‘global multistakeholder community’, to a largely multilateral process like the WSIS, the divide between multistakeholderism and multilateralism is best described as a spectrum. At the heart of the multilateralism versus multistakeholderism debate is the role played by governments in the global governance of the internet.

In line with its policy in other issue areas, India had for long supported multilateralism in internet governance as well. However, at the IGF in Baku in 2012, the then Minister for Communication and Information Technology, Mr. Kapil Sibal came out in favour of multistakeholderism. Ever since, India’s external stance has warmed towards multistakeholderism. The critical juncture, as many observers note came at the ICANN52 meeting in Buenos Aires last year when Mr. Ravi Shankar Prasad, the Minister for Communications and Information Technology declared India’s unequivocal support for multistakeholderism.

Almost all respondents interviewed for our report believed that there is a need for consistent engagement with domestic stakeholders that could translate into greater Indian engagement on global internet governance. In the absence of strong interest from the private sector, they also believed that the government had a central role to play in creating such a domestic multistakeholder environment. This would also be in line with many countries around the world which have set up domestic and regional IGFs. Such initiatives help create a space for domestic conversations on internet related issues in a multistakeholder setting that could better inform policy making. In the last few months, countries in the neighbourhood like Pakistan and Bangladesh have announced domestic initiatives similar to the IGF. However, as the experience of the IIGF suggests, this may be a non-starter in India.

India Internet Governance Forum

Following the establishment of the IGF in 2006, many national and regional IGFs have been established around the world. Domestic IGFs have served as discursive spaces which feed into international policy making bodies. These initiatives have also contributed to knowledge dissemination and help increasing the interest of stakeholders in internet governance.

The US-India Cyber Framework, the IANA Transition and the upcoming ICANN57 meeting in Hyderabad have generated a lot of buzz around internet governance in India. ICANN57 in particular offers an opportunity to restart the conversation around domestic multistakeholder engagement and possibly the IIGF. It remains to be seen if this will be a temporary spike in interest or if it can be sustained in the coming months to create a tangible framework for domestic stakeholder engagement.

Puneeth Nagaraj is a Project Managers at the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi

Implementing Enhanced Cooperation

By Puneeth Nagaraj

One of the important outcomes of the WSIS+10 review was the establishment of the CSTD (Commission on Science and Technology for Development) Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation (WGEC). Subsequently, the establishment of the WGEC was announced in February with Peter Major as its chair and the nomination process to the WGEC will conclude shortly. The WGEC will be constituted by the end of the month. This affords us an opportunity to reflect on the meaning on Enhanced Cooperation (EC) and how it can be implemented.

The notion of Enhanced Cooperation can be found in paragraphs 69-71 of the Tunis Agenda. However, the term itself has been used extensively within the European Union since the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. In the EU, the term refers to a certain number of EU Member States (usually 9) that are allowed to establish advanced integration or cooperation without the involvement of other members. In the context of the WSIS, debate has raged on for the last decade over the exact meaning of the term. The reference in the Tunis Agenda to EC leaves room for a lot of ambiguity. During the WSIS+10 negotiations, many delegations debated over whether EC is already taking place or if structures need to be put in place to implement it. Below are three ideas for the implementation of Enhanced Cooperation.

Stakeholder Participation

First is clarifying the roles of different stakeholder groups, in various Internet Governance fora. Engaging with the WSIS+10 Review has shown us that despite the emerging consensus on multistakeholder models of governance, there can be significant barriers to the participation of stakeholder representatives. The Review, unlike the Geneva and Tunis Summits was not an open process, driven primarily by Member States. Hence, the space afforded to other stakeholders was limited. This is against the ideal of “full participation of all stakeholders” as per the Tunis Agenda (para 31). To this end, establishing clear terms of civil society engagement in the various Internet Governance institutions should be an important function of the WGEC.

Funding Mechanisms

Second, both the Tunis Agenda and the WSIS+10 outcome document call for innovative funding mechanisms to facilitate ICT4D programmes. With the failure of the Digital Solidarity Fund, most ICT related development programmes are predominantly funded by Official Development Assistance (ODA). An oft ignored part of the WISS process is the governance of funding mechanisms. An allied issue is the delineation of the various UN bodies involved in the SDG process as they relate to ICTs. The WSIS+10 Outcome document stressed the overlaps with the SDG process but did not describe how this synergy was to be achieved. In the absence of an explicit ICT related goal in the SDG process, identifying the roles of organizations like the ITU, UNESCO, UNCTAD among others in fulfilling this dual mandate will be an important aspect of Enhanced Cooperation. The ITU has taken an important first step in identifying the overlaps between the WSIS Action lines and the SDGs. It is up to the WGEC to expand upon this effort and create synergy between the two processes.

Human Rights

Third, the crux of Enhanced Cooperation is in developing global public policy principles (Tunis Agenda para 70). One of the positive outcomes of the WSIS+10 review was the incorporation of a separate section on human rights. This recognition will be meaningless without embedding human rights into all global IG institutions. ICANN has recently, very encouragingly approved its human rights mandate. As the IGF also undergoes a transformation through the renewed Working Group on Improvements to the Internet Governance Forum, this is an important moment to establish public policy principles as they relate to human rights. The WGEC is the best place to create principles or governance frameworks to support human rights and other public interest issues. The UN HRC and Special Rapporteurs on Free Speech and Privacy have made important strides in this area. The WGEC should attempt to synthesize these efforts to produce adaptable standards for various IG institutions.

Puneeth Nagaraj is a Project Managers at the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi

Three Questions on Digital Trade

By Puneeth Nagaraj

The inclusion of an e-commerce chapter in the recently concluded TPP Agreement has sparked off a debate around the world on internet issues being a part of trade agreements. In my last post I had looked at the efforts of civil society groups trying to engage with various trade negotiation processes through the EFF Meeting in Brussels. In this piece, I identify three issue areas that borrow from both trade and internet governance worlds to form some of the foundational concerns in this emerging area.

1. Incorporating Internet Governance norms

One of the criticisms of the inclusion of internet related provisions in trade agreements has been the way it is framed. As provisions that govern e-commerce, TPP and similar new generations trade agreements adopt a commoditized approach to internet regulation. This may not be a problem in and of itself. But, in the absence of hard law rules internationally on many internet-related issues, there is a danger that the trade law rules could become the default international rules on many of these issues. The TPP for instance contains provisions that could potentially impact privacy, the disclosure of source codes and network neutrality.

However, these issues are being resolved at either the national or regional levels through public consultations, guidelines and even legislations. One such example is the recent debate in India over network neutrality. To create a regulatory environment that gives states enough space to make rules on such issues, such domestic or regional rules as standards should be incorporated in future agreements. This will ensure that laws that are enacted from an internet governance standpoint are not superseded by commercial rules.

2. Human Rights and Social Obligations

The problem with trade rules that often take a commoditized approach to privacy and network neutrality is that they are either human rights or have human rights implications. Privacy has over the last few years been recognised internationally as a human right. Network neutrality on the other hand has significant free speech implications and can also affect the right to access which is also being seen as a right. There has been discussion in the past for an “Internet Bill of Rights”. While this is yet to take any tangible form at the international level, there are a group of human rights -like free speech, privacy and the right to, access to name a few- that have taken on greater importance in the context of the internet.

The recognition or mention of these rights in trade agreements will, 1) ensure that these rights aren’t eroded and 2) encourage the diffusion of human rights through trading partners. This is not without precedent. The EU has for long incorporated human rights provisions in its engagement with third parties. On environment and labour issues, both the EU and US trade agreements over the last decade have included “Social Standards” that must be enforced domestically by the trading partner. Extending this treatment to internet rights will only be a continuation of existing trade policy.

3. Excluding Developing Countries from Rule Making

The biggest impact of these agreements is the shift of the trade regime away from a multilateral setting like the WTO. By negotiating plurilateral and mega-regional agreements between a small group of countries, the TPP, TISA and TTIP (to name a few) are making new rules on trade and creating higher standards. But this also means that a large majority of countries are excluded from these rules which are likely to become the new standards for trade and also potentially affect development goals.

E-commerce chapters in the TPP and TISA (proposed) are the best examples of this phenomena. The internet over the last decade has been an engine of growth across the world and especially in developing countries. A significant part of this has been through the exchange of goods and services online. In the absence of rules to govern the internet internationally, all countries are at a relatively equal footing to benefit from the digital economy. However, as these new generation agreements create new rules and standards for participation in the digital economy, it could also potentially create barriers for developing countries to participate in it. While there is no obvious solution to this issue, keeping the internet open and accessible should go some way in resolving it.

Resolving the above three questions should bring coherence to policy debates around e-commerce rules in trade agreements. The debate is complicated as it involves the overlap of two competing global regimes. But there are policy gaps that can be filled by engaging on the above issues in a meaningful way.

Puneeth Nagaraj is a Project Managers at the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi

A New Agenda for Digital Trade: Ideas from Brussels

By Puneeth Nagaraj

This author was one of the participants in the strategy meeting at the invitation of the Electronic Frontier Foundation

The Strategy Meeting on Catalyzing Reform of Trade Negotiation Processes was held last week in Brussels. Convened by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), it brought a diverse group of actors to chart an agenda to engage with trade negotiations in the emerging area of Digital Trade. Representatives from civil society groups, academia and the private sector met together to suggest solutions to make trade negotiations more transparent and accessible.

The meeting was prompted by the recent conclusion of the Trans Pacific Partnership and its inclusion of an e-commerce chapter. The TPP is the first of many new generation trade agreements- which include both mega regional and plurilateral agreements- which are increasingly making trade rules that affect the internet. Given that there is a global internet governance regime which does not create any hard law obligations, there is a danger of the trade law regime becoming the de facto international rules on the subject.

To address this pressing concern, the EFF convened policy practitioners and experts from both the internet governance and trade fields. Participants highlighted the need for research at the intersection of these diverse fields to understand the impact of trade agreements on the internet and the information society. The larger and more immediate concern of all participants was of the confidentiality under which these negotiations are being conducted. This is also at odds with the participatory norms of various internet governance institutions which count for openness, transparency and accountability as their governing ideals.

Aside from the diverging approaches to participatory norms and governance, trade agreements are also at odds with internet governance frameworks. For instance, many internet governance fora are multistakeholder platforms which allow for the participation of the civil society, private sector and technical communities on equal footing with governments. Trade agreements or even institutions like the World Trade Organization are multilateral and allow for very little access to other stakeholders.

The approach of trade agreements to substantive issues reduce the regulatory space available on many internet-related rules. Trade agreements aim to promote trade through liberalization. This often leads to a commercialised or commoditised approach to many of the issues they make rules on. This is evidenced from the debates and cases on issues like environment and intellectual property where policies of national governments taken in public interest have come in to question. Such a commoditized framework of rules has already been extended to the internet by the TPP. It is perhaps telling that the chapter that deals with internet related issues is called the ‘E-commerce’ chapter. However, many of the provisions of the chapter go beyond e-commerce and contains rules on issues like privacy, data transfers and net neutrality- which are core internet governance issues. Coupled with a dispute resolution mechanism, the trade regime on the internet could potentially subsume internet related policy making at the international level.

With these problems in mind, the participants at the meeting, had to come up with workable strategies to engage with trade negotiations on internet-related issues. The meeting split into breakout groups that looked at 3 broad issues: 1) transparency and new norms, 2) advocacy and liaison with allies and 3) civil society funding, capacity building and coordination. Some solutions like creating a civil society coordination group and creating a space for multistakeholder engagement were on process. Others, like creating expert groups and producing research at the intersection of these two new areas were on substance.

The strategy meeting was very useful in terms of bringing together a group of experts from two different fields. It also made everyone alive to the challenges that lay ahead in the intersectional area of internet and trade. The strategies that were suggested also reflected this diversity of thought with a mix of ideas from the trade and internet governance worlds.  The meeting concluded with efforts to draft a common statement which left the participants with a rich agenda for future work on internet and trade issues.

Puneeth Nagaraj is a Project Managers at the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi

Wuzhen 2015: Evaluating China’s Competing Vision of the Internet

By Puneeth Nagaraj

The 2^nd World Internet Conference (WIC) was held in the town of Wuzhen in China from 16^th-18^th December, 2015. Organized by the Chinese government since 2014, the WIC is China’s attempt to present an alternate vision of internet governance, with its pitch for increased ‘cyber-sovereignty’. This is in contrast to the prevailing notion across the world that internet should be governed by a multistakeholder model. The WIC is part of China’s effort to establish a stronger presence in the internet governance sphere, with many in China likening Wuzhen to an ‘internet Davos’.

One of the ways the Chinese government is attempting to make its presence felt is by attracting high profile names to the WIC. The 2^nd edition made news for the presence of Fadi Chehade, the ICANN CEO.  Chehade was also appointed to the High Level Advisory Committee of the WIC’s organizing Secretariat, a move that has come in for criticism from some quarters. He is among a list of appointees that include Jack Ma of the Alibaba group and Werner Zorn, the “father of the German Internet”. But the 2^nd edition was notable for its absentees as much as it was for those who attended it. The resistance to an event like the WIC is based on China’s idea of cyber-sovereignty and fears of creating a walled internet that limits access to the internet based on jurisdiction.

In his speech at the opening ceremony of the WIC, Chinese President Xi Jinping- on whose account the conference was suddenly moved from October to December– reiterated China’s case for sovereign control of the internet. China has traditionally made the contested claim that the notion of sovereign control of the internet is based on the principle of sovereign equality, as enshrined in the UN Charter. This position is completely in opposition to the idea that all stakeholders should play an equal role in the governance of the internet given the historical role of the different stakeholders in the creation and development of the internet.

However, China’s claim to sovereignty over the internet is not without its supporters. For instance, the ITU Secretary General Zhao Houlin spoke at the WIC of the difference between internet governance which should involve all stakeholders and cybersecurity where states should play a dominant role. This is also consistent with ITU’s position as a multilateral institution which facilitates inter-state discussions on issues like cybersecurity.

On the issue of cybersecurity, China’s position is on firmer ground. The Outcome Document of the recently concluded WSIS 10-year review, points to the consensus among States of the ‘leading role’ played by States in cybersecurity matters. The High Level Meeting of the WSIS Review which happened at the same time as the WIC presented the best evidence of this position. Countries from across the board pushed for language that reiterated the central role of States in cybersecurity issues, rejecting suggestions for a more human rights compatible approach that took on board other stakeholders. Thus, the opposition to China’s push for greater prominence in the internet sphere is not based merely on its support of cyber-sovereignty.

Rather, the resistance stems from a deeper of mistrust of China based on the government’s domestic stranglehold over the internet. Activists have long protested China’s blocking of many popular services like Google, Facebook and Twitter which continue to remain unavailable in China. Ironically, it has been reported that international participants of the 2^nd WIC were surreptitiously given access to these sites through special devices and ‘cheat codes’.

Yet, commentators are divided over whether the wider international community must engage with an event like the WIC. Some advocate a healthy scepticism towards China’s own policies, but point to the benefits of engaging directly with the Chinese government on what is meant to be an international platform for internet governance. Others argue that despite the marginal benefits of engaging with China, large scale attendance of the WIC would grant legitimacy to the arguably repressive policies Chinese government.

Criticism notwithstanding, China is committed to making WIC a platform where a competing vision of internet governance can gain traction. Whether this actually happens depends on 1) how open and accessible the next editions of the WIC are to the wider internet community; and 2) how willing the Chinese government is to engage in other internet governance fora that are more multistakeholder than multilateral. China has already succeeded in similar initiatives in other issue domains like trade where it hosts an annual trade fair that is widely attended. Appointing a High Level Advisory Board comprising of the CEO of a multistakeholder institution like ICANN and an internationally well regarded figure like Jack Ma (who is part of the coordination council of the NetMundial initiative) seems like a step in the right direction. It remains to be seen if this will lead to other such moves or if the WIC will be confined to a corner of the internet governance map.

Puneeth Nagaraj is a Project Managers at the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi

No Recognition for the New Generation of Digital Rights

By Puneeth Nagaraj and Gangesh Varma

The original article was published on The Wire on 5th January, 2016.

Plenty of Loose Ends. Credit: Pascal Charest/Flickr CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

The international community’s attempt to shape a new agenda for the Information Society by taking forward the Declaration of Principles and the Tunis Agenda adopted over a decade ago has produced a mixed bag that disappoints more than it pleases.

The WSIS was a two-phase summit which was initiated in 2003 at Geneva and had its second phase in 2005 at Tunis. The summit was a reaction to the growing importance of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in development and a recognition of the crucial role the Internet played in shaping the landscape of the information society. The first phase in Geneva focused on a wide range of issues affecting the information society including human rights, and ICTs for development. The Tunis Agenda in 2005 was focused on developing financing mechanisms for ICT for development and governance of the Internet. The Tunis Agenda was also the first time a globally negotiated instrument articulated a definition of Internet governance and incorporated the notion of multistakeholder governance. However, it was a negotiated outcome in the debate between multilateral and multistakeholder models in global governance. This resulted in the inclusion of the ambiguous concept of  ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ which was conceived as a device to discuss unresolved contentions.

The ten-year review in 2015 was meant to take stock of the changes in the information society since Tunis and create a new agenda for the next decade. The conclusion of the high level meeting with an agreed outcome document means the negotiations were completed successfully. But the outcome itself is a qualified success at best.

Outcome document

The review process has revealed that while there are new concerns that have emerged from the evolution of the Internet and its uses, the underlying debates still remain the same. For instance, human rights and cybersecurity were both issues that were covered by the Tunis Agenda. But the fact that they have their own sections in 2015 highlights the increased importance of both these issues. Internet governance, on the other hand is an issue that has not moved in the last 10 years.

World leaders at WSIS 2003, Geneva, where the original Declaration of Principles were adopted. Credit: Jean-Marc Ferré

The inclusion of a separate section on human rights has received praise from all quarters. It is also a testament to the increasing importance of human rights in the information society. The acknowledgement of human rights resolutions from other fora like the Human Rights Council and human rights instruments like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is encouraging. This means that nations have an additional mandate to respect human rights obligations while dealing with the Internet and ICT issues. At the same time, it must be noted that no reference was made to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which is especially pertinent for countries from the Global South.

It is also disappointing that the document fails to recognise a new generation of ‘digital rights’ that have increased in importance over the last decade. There is only a passing reference to privacy and there is no mention of network neutrality at all. It appears from the statements at the General Assembly that countries like the US and UK were not very keen on privacy and network neutrality. On the other hand, many European countries, notably the Netherlands, were pushing for stronger language on these issues. The outcome text is a negotiated compromise on many issues and the human rights language is the best example of this. But the fact that it ignores widespread public sentiment on issues that will be at the forefront over the next decade is worrying.

On Internet governance, the outcome text calls for immediate, concrete action on Enhanced Cooperation and greater participation in Internet governance institutions. But if this section of the outcome document is compared with the Tunis Agenda, it would seem like nothing has changed in the last decade. The outcome document is an attempt to update many foundational concepts in Internet governance such as Enhanced Cooperation and multistakeholderism. India for its part, reiterated support for a multistakeholder model but also drew attention to the importance of greater representation and participation of actors from the developing world in multistakeholder platforms.  One such platform is the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), whose mandate was extended for another 10 years. Unfortunately the conditionalities of the extension, including showing tangible outcomes on issues like accountability and representation, were diluted during the final negotiations. The outcome document thus failed to adequately address many pressing issues like the need for greater accountability and meaningful participation on Internet governance platforms.

Increasing threats to cybersecurity and the difficulty in dealing with cybersecurity is a concern that all countries were alive to. For developing countries, the capacity to deal with such threats heightened the importance of this issue. The outcome document reflects this position with a separate section on cybersecurity. It recognises the central role of states in dealing with cybersecurity issues, but also acknowledges the role other stakeholders have to play. The role that cybersecurity measures have to play in securing development projects through ICTs and the Internet has also been highlighted. However, the cybersecurity language fails to acknowledge the need to create a safe and secure Internet ecosystem for all users. As it stands, this section takes a securitised view of the Internet. This is unfortunate given that an earlier version of the document circulated last week took a more nuanced approach that focussed on the cyberspace as a safe platform whereas the outcome document takes a protectionist approach . However, like the human rights text, it appears that this was a casualty of negotiated compromise.

India’s Role

India played a critical role in negotiations, and contributed to an international agreement around the idea that all stakeholders, and not just governments, need to be a part of conversations about Internet governance. Speaking at the high level meeting of the 10-year review of the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), the Indian delegation emphasised the role the Internet and ICTs have played in the country’s remarkable growth story over the last decade. India, along with other developing nation delegations were also quick to point out there is still a lot of work to be done in connecting the four billion people worldwide who have no access to the Internet.

Broadly speaking, India played a crucial role in these negotiations as a key swing state. On many contentious issues, the country played a facilitative role. On issues where the stated government policy aligned with the middle ground, like multistakeholderism and human rights, India took strong positions that helped achieve consensus. This was evident from its statement at the General Assembly supporting multistakeholderism but calling for greater representation. Similarly, India supported the outcome document on many issues like Internet governance, access and development but highlighted its own priorities in the process.

India’s role in bringing the WSIS negotiations to a successful conclusion has not gone unnoticed. Its unequivocal positions on contentious issues have come in for praise in the international community. However, the most difficult part of the process lies ahead in realising the WSIS vision and achieving the SDGs (sustainable development goals) over the next decade. India certainly has a big role to play in fulfilling both these international mandates and domestic development goals. It remains to be seen if it can rise to the challenge.

Puneeth Nagaraj and Gangesh Varma are Project Managers at the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi

Lessons from Busan: Report on the 1st Young ICT Leaders’s Forum

By Puneeth Nagaraj

The author was one of 35 international participants selected by the ITU and the city of Busan to attend this event.

The three day Young ICT Leaders’ Forum jointly organised by the city of Busan, South Korea and the International Telecommunications Union came to a close on Friday, the 11th of December. The forum was attended by young professionals in the ICT Sector from over 30 countries. Pursuant to a commitment made by the city of Busan as the host of last year’s ITU Plenipotentiary conference, the event sought to inform the next generation of ICT policymakers from around the world. The first two days featured presentations by representatives of the Korean government and industry, and the ITU. Since the forum had a thematic focus on the Internet of Things(IoT), the third day involved field visits to IoT facilities around Busan.

Many of the Korean representatives made presentations of projects that were funded by the Creative Vitamins Project on Day 1. A joint initiative of the National Information Society Agency (NIA) and the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, the Creative Vitamins Project is funding upto 50 projects in the IoT space in the next 2 years. The projects presented (at various stages of completion) included smart cars, aerial drones that monitored illegal fishing, smart electric grids, healthcare IoT technologies and smart factories. The smart car presentation was particularly useful. As a technology that is close to being a commercial reality, the presentation of Su-Jin Kwag of KATECH was particularly useful in mapping the government, industry and policy inputs that went into the completion of this project.

Day 2 kicked off with a keynote address by Mr. Houlin Zhao, the Secretary General of the ITU. He noted the critical role IoT can play in the realisation of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The day also featured presentations from other ITU representatives on ITU’s activities in the Asia-Pacific region. In the second half of the day, participants discussed ICT policy challenges in their respective countries. The author had the chance to rapporteur one of the breakout groups.

Though many of the participants worked in technical areas, they were acutely aware of the policy and governance challenges that affected their work. Access, human rights and government corruption were issues that came up repeatedly in these discussions. Ms. Xiaoya Yang led the interactive session and along with representatives of the Korean industry provided valuable feedback on the outcomes of the breakout session. Through their feedback, they asked participants to focus on short and medium term solutions that can improve access to ICTs while being aware of long term, structural issues like corruption. They stressed the need for innovative thinking to overcome many of the challenges encountered by policy makers in developing countries.

On day 3, participants were taken on field visits to two centers of IoT research within Pusan. The first was the IoT Centre at the Pusan National University, where participants had the chance to interact with researchers working on cutting edge IoT research in healthcare, smart grids among other technologies. The second was the Hyundai factory in Ulsan which is almost entirely automated. Many of the production processes at the factory incorporated IoT technologies.

In addition to the above, the Forum afforded participants a chance to immerse themselves in Busan with cultural programmes and other social activities.

Puneeth Nagaraj is a Project Manager at the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi

CCG’s Analysis of the WSIS+10 Draft Outcome Document- Initial Thoughts

By Puneeth Nagaraj

The draft outcome document for the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) High Level Meeting in December has been released today (it can be accessed here). This draft is a revision of the Zero Draft based on discussions held in New York last month i.e., the 2nd Preparatory Meeting and the 2nd Informal Consultations. Our coverage of those two meetings can be found here. The Outcome Document will be the basis for informal multilateral discussions to be held from 19-20 and 24-25 November. As per our understanding at this point, these discussions will be closed door meetings between country representatives and will not be open to other stakeholders. Below is a summary of the major changes from the Zero Draft to the Outcome Document:

New Section on Human Rights

Easily the most contentious part of the Zero Draft which had subsumed Human Rights discussions under the heading of Internet Governance. This had attracted criticism from civil society groups and many Member countries. The Draft Outcome Document now contains a separate section on human rights. In terms of content, this new section on Human Rights is notable for the explicit recognition in Paragraph 38 of journalists, bloggers and civil society actors in supporting freedom of expression and plurality. This is a big and welcome change from the Zero draft which only cited the freedom of press in the limited context of journalists. Paragraph 38 is also important given the recent attacks against bloggers in many countries who have been targeted for expressing their views online.

Also notable is the explicit recognition of the Right to Development in Paragraph 40 and the reaffirmation of the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelation of all human rights. The latter is a concept enshrined in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and an integral component of International Human Rights Law. Its recognition in the Outcome Document is important as these concepts need to be reinforced in the Information Society. This is because many of the rights based discussions online are often connected to other issues such as development, access and security. These cannot be discussed in isolation. This idea has been discussed in some detail in CCG’s comment on the non-paper.

The emphasis placed on the right to privacy on the context of mass surveillance in Paragraph 42 is also a new addition. This expands on the earlier Paragraph 43 from the Zero Draft which merely encouraged stakeholders to respect privacy and the protection of personal information. The expanded Paragraph 42 in the outcome Document is a vast improvement, calling on countries to respect International Human Rights law as it relates to mass surveillance. Para 42 also explicitly cites General Assembly Resolution 69/166 which recognised the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age.

Though the improvements to the Human Rights paragraphs in the document are welcome, Human Rights is still listed as the 2nd section which is contrary to the calls made by civil society groups to list it as the first.

Linkages with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

A common concern across stakeholder groups in the October meetings was to link the WSIS process with the SDGs. While earlier drafts cited the SDGs, they failed to identify specific goals that could be linked with the WSIS process. Though the SDGs do not a have a separate goal that mentions ICTs or the internet, the understanding was that as a cross-cutting issue there are many potential linkages between the two processes.

The capacity of ICTs to facilitate the fulfillment of all SDGs has been mentioned in Paragraph 14. It also lists Goal 4b on Education and Scholarships, Goal 5b on Women’s Empowerment, Goal 9c on Infrastructure and Access and Goal 17.8 on Technology Bank and Capacity Building as specific goals where this linkages can be particularly useful. In Follow Up and Review, the document in Paragraph calls for the CSTD review to feed into the SDG process in Paragraph 58. Additionally, Paragraph 62 designates the High Level Meeting in 2025 as an input process into the 2030 Review of the SDGs.

ICT for Development

In this section, the Outcome document takes a more nuanced view of development issues and the Digital Divide, however a few key ideas are still missing.

Paragraph 19 on cultural expression and Paragraph 23 on Local Content in different languages highlight the need for greater diversity online. The discussion on the Digital divide has also improved from the Zero Draft with Paragraph 22 calling for the creation of knowledge societies and for UN bodies to analyse the nature of the digital divide.  Paragraph 25 dedicated to the Gender divide is a much needed addition and it calls for immediate measures to address this divide. However, the discussion on the digital divide is lacking in that it fails to recognise that the digital divide is a manifestation of existing socio-economic inequalities. It also fails to reognise that access to the internet and ICTs should be rights based and equitable. While the role of ICTs in development is not disputed, having differential access to ICTs or the internet can actually serve to exacerbate the digital divide. Though this point has been made repeatedly, the draft outcome document does not acknowledge it.

Paragraph 36 is also notable as it calls for new mechanisms to fund ICT4D as opposed to the Zero Draft which called for the Digital Solidarity Fund to be reviewed. The position on the DSF has since changed as States and other stakeholders in October recognized that the DSF cannot be strengthened and a new mechanism is necessary.

New Section on Security

Much like human rights, many countries- especially the G77+China- called for a separate section on security issues. Thus, the outcome document has a new section 3 on Building Confidence and Security in the use of ICTs which was the erstwhile Section 2.3 in the Zero Draft.

Paragraph 45 is a change from the earlier Paragraph 46 in the Zero Draft. It notes the ‘leading role’ of governments in cybersecurity as opposed to the Zero Draft which called on them to play an enhanced role. The recognition of the need for security measures to be consistent with Human Rights is a much needed change.

Paragraph 46 of the Draft Outcome Document on cyber-ethics has been expanded to explicitly refer to the need to protect and empower children, women and girls.

Paragraphs 48 and 49 call for greater cooperation among States on cybersecurity matters. In a change from the Zero draft, these paragraphs have placed greater emphasis on cooperation and information sharing across stakeholders and between States. The call for an international cybercrimes convention in the Zero Draft has been changed to an acknowledgment of the call for such a convention.

Internet Governance

The absence of the mention of multistakeholderism or multistakeholder approaches is conspicuous in this Section. In fact Paragraph 50 suggests that internet governance is a multilateral process with “the full involvement of all stakeholders”.

The mandate of the IGF should be extended by 10 years according to Paragraph 54. However, it calls on the IGF to incorporate the findings of the CSTD Working Group on Improvements to the IGF and that the IGF should show progress on these lines. On Enhanced Cooperation, Paragraph 56 calls on the Secretary General to provide a report to the next (71st) General Assembly on the implementation and means to improve Enhanced Cooperation.

Follow-Up and Review

The most notable addition is the call for a High Level Meeting in 2025 to Review the WSIS Outcomes in Paragraph 62. This suggests some sort of a compromise between States as there were multiple proposals on whether there should be a Summit or a High Level Meeting. The section is also notable for the explicit recognition of the ways in which the WSIS Process can be linked with the SDGs. Other than the linkages mentioned above, Paragraph 52 calls for the WSIS Action Lines to be closely linked to the SDG process.

The Outcome Document is a more complete Document than the Zero Draft in many ways. However, there are a few issues that need to be ironed out before the High Level Meeting. With the process closed for stakeholders from now on , most of these changes will largely come from States. Though the co-facilitators have called for comments to be sent on the Draft Outcome Document, it is not on the same scale as the public comment periods and it is not clear how much these suggestions will be taken into consideration by them. In the absence of another Informal Consultation, their interaction with stakeholders at the IGF may be the last opportunity to participate in this process before the High Level Meeting.

Puneeth Nagaraj is a Project Manager at the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi

Indian Statements on Implementation and Follow up at 2nd Preparatory Meeting

By Puneeth Nagaraj

India made a third statement today, this time on the Implementation and Follow up of the WSIS Review. Below is the Statement:

The essence of what we’ve been discussing is Implementation and Follow-up. Talking about action lines is also talking about implementation. It is an assessment of whether we have succeeded or not. The WSIS document is commendable as it stands. We are in favour of an ongoing review process. But also support a High Level Meeting to look at these at some point. We do not understand approach of not changing anything or changing Action Lines. We’re talking about a dynamic platform like the internet, the manner in which it has changed the economy, lifestyles of people around the world would tell us that more is yet to come. Therefore we must be talking constantly about Cybersecurity, ICT4D and human rights as change is happening at rapid pace. Not being ready to review Action Lines or High Level Meeting that brings to attention issues that needs to be addressed is not understandable. Support Review Process and High Level Meeting at a period agreeable to Member states.”

In response to a query from the US on why a Review was needed the Indian delegation had the following to say:

This Review platform is a different one from the ongoing review. If ongoing review was efficient we wouldn’t be sitting here. Review must happen at the UNGA in 2020. We will continue to call for it.We urge the reconsideration of the approach that Review or High Level Meeting is not needed. Societies that have reached a certain level of development and want to manage growth over the next 10 years like India need Review. India is targeting internet for all by 2020. There will be several consequences for all. It will be mostly positive, but there might be negative as well. We are an open democracy. Voices are expressed and encouraged in India. UNGA must have Review in 2020.

Puneeth Nagaraj is a Project Manager at the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi