NOTE: The title of the post was edited subsequent to the SC rejecting a plea to reexamine the meaning of Hindutva as interpreted in the 1996 Manohar Joshi judgment
Mr. Arvind P. Datar continued his arguments on Day 2. He commenced by referring to his earlier arguments from the previous day on the interplay of Sections 98 and 99 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (‘RPA’) and reiterated the issues framed by the three judge bench mentioned here.
He submitted that there is no conflict with the stand taken by the Supreme Court in the Manohar Joshi case. He read out several relevant portions of the judgment which talks about the mandatory nature of Section 99 especially where a returned candidate has been alleged of corrupt practice vicariously for the conduct of any other person with his consent. He stated that the question regarding the returned candidate being guilty of corrupt practice can be decided only at the end of the trial after an enquiry against the other person is concluded by issuing them notices under Section 99 and accordingly, the trial under Sections 98 and 99 has to be a composite trial. According to Mr. Datar, it will lead to an absurd situation if the trial against the returned candidate is concluded first and then the proceedings under Section 99 are commenced for the purpose of deciding whether any other person is also required to be named as being guilty of the corrupt practice. After extensive arguments on this issue, Justice Goel was of the opinion that the trial under Sections 98 and 99 must be one composite trial which may take place in two steps but not in two separate phases.
The Court then posed a question to Mr. Datar regarding the stage at which notice can be issued to a third party and the nature of such notice under Sections 98 and 99 since none of the previous cases have examined or answered this issue. Mr. Datar reiterated his submission that Sections 98 and 99 have to be interpreted to mean that notice to a third party can be issued only during trial and not at the conclusion of the trial. Furthermore, the Chief Justice opined that a notice cannot be issued mechanically by the High Court. Before issuing such notice, the High Court has to be prima facie satisfied with the role of the collaborators in the commission of the corrupt practice.
In regard to the nature of notice under Section 99, Mr. Datar referred to the third issue framed by the three judge bench i.e.,
“On reaching the conclusion that consent is proved and prima facie corrupt practices are proved, whether the notice under Section 99(1) proviso (a) should contain, like mini judgment, extraction of pleadings of corrupt practices under Section 123, the evidence – oral and documentary and findings on each of the corrupt practices by each of the collaborators, if there are more than one, and supply them to all of them for giving an opportunity to be complied with?”
Mr. Datar contended that the notice to a third party or collaborator should contain the specific charges and specific portions of the speech allegedly amounting to corrupt practice. With reference to the Manohar Joshi case, he contended that the notice does not have to be in the form of a mini judgment. At this juncture, the Chief Justice expressed reservations on the use of the phrase “mini judgment” and opined that it is not appropriate to use the word in this context.
The Court also observed that the judicial principles that govern the analogous provision contained in Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code should also apply to Section 99 of the RPA. The Court further observed that since it is a quasi-criminal charge under the RPA, apart from the evaluation of evidence, the third person or collaborator to whom notice is being issued has to be informed of the reasons for such issuance of notice.
Thereafter, the Court considered the issue of ‘naming’ of a third person or a collaborator under Section 99. The issues under consideration were firstly, when can you ‘name’ a third party or collaborator and secondly, whether ‘naming’ is mandatory under Section 99. Mr. Datar contended that on a conjoint reading of Sections 98, 99 and 123(3), it is clear that there are only three categories of persons who can be named i.e. the candidate, his agent or any other person who has indulged in corrupt practices with the consent of the candidate.
While dealing with this subject, the Chief Justice posed a very pertinent question as to whether a person can be ‘named’ for corrupt practices under Section 99 for a speech made prior to the elections. To exhort his point further he gave an instance where elections may be scheduled for after four years. But, a person preparing to contest the elections may request some religious leaders to make speeches on his behalf. The candidate may then use the video recording of the speech at the time of elections. In such a situation can the religious leaders be ‘named’ under Section 99 for having committed a corrupt practice since the speeches were made prior to the notification of elections?
After testing various such propositions, the Chief Justice concluded that the test is not whether the speech was made prior to the elections but whether it was made with the consent of the candidate. If it was made with the consent of the candidate then the religious leaders can very well be named for having committed corrupt practices. He further questioned whether it is mandatory for the Court to name every person who has committed a corrupt practice but is not made a party. Mr. Datar replied in the negative to this proposition.
Mr. Datar through an example sought to distinguish between two scenarios – firstly, where two corrupt practices were committed, one by the candidate independently and one by his agent. Secondly, where the candidate is alleged of a corrupt practice based on the conduct of another. He reasoned that in the first scenario since the candidate had committed a corrupt practice independently, his agent need not be named. Whereas, in the second scenario, since the allegation of corrupt practice against the candidate was based on the conduct of another person, it was necessary to name that other person in order to prove corrupt practice. Therefore, ‘naming’ under Section 99 in the second scenario was contended to be mandatory and non-compliance of which would vitiate the finding of corrupt practice against the candidate.
Taking his argument forward, Mr. Datar said that there cannot be a straitjacket formula while coming to the conclusion of corrupt practice. As stated in the second scenario mentioned above, it is mandatory to name and hear the third person who made the speech before holding the candidate guilty of consenting to the corrupt practice.
The Chief Justice opined that there cannot be recording of finding of corrupt practice unless the person who has committed such corrupt practice is identified. The Chief Justice then considered the case of Mr. Abhiram Singh on its merits and observed that since all the evidence and findings are against Mr. Abhiram Singh and he was given an opportunity of being heard and to prove his case, then it is irrelevant whether the other persons were named or not. Therefore, this does not vitiate the finding or decision against him.
Post lunch, Mr. Shyam Divan appearing for one of the respondents in a connected matter commenced his arguments by narrating the brief facts of his case. Thereafter, he addressed the Court by referring to the legislative history of Section 123(3) of the RPA in order to better understand the scope and interpretation of the said section.
Mr. Divan elaborated that the issue for consideration before the bench was only limited to the interpretation of “his religion” appearing in Section 123(3). For a better understanding of Section 123(3), Mr. Divan briefly took the Court through the parliamentary debates pertaining to the section and also the various legislative amendments to the Section.
Mr. Divan will continue with his submissions when the hearing continues tomorrow.